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Pay for Performance for Specialised Care in England 
  
27 May 2019 
 
Abstract 
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common internationally, yet 
evidence of their effectiveness remains ambiguous. P4P has been widely used in England for 
over a decade both in primary and secondary care. A prominent P4P programme in secondary 
care is the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework. The most recent 
addition to this framework is Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) CQUIN, introduced into the 
NHS in England in 2013. This study offers a review and critique of the PSS CQUIN scheme for 
specialised care. A key feature of PSS CQUIN is that whilst it is centrally developed, 
performance targets are agreed locally. This means that there is variation across providers in: 
the schemes selected from the national menu, the achievement level needed to earn 
payment, and the proportion of the overall payment attached to each scheme. Specific 
schemes vary in terms of what is incentivised  ? structure, process and/or outcome  ? and how 
they are incentivised. Centralised versus decentralised decision making, the nature of the 
performance measures, the tiered payment structure and the dynamic nature of the schemes 
have created a sophisticated but complex P4P programme which requires evaluation to 
understand the effect of such incentives on specialised care.  
Key words: Pay-for-Performance, Specialised Care, National Health Service, Financial 
Incentives, Health Policy.  
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Policy background 
 
Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programmes link financial payments by funders to quality of care 
supplied by healthcare providers. They are increasingly common across OECD countries such 
as the United States, Australia, Japan and European countries (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016; 
Mendelson et al., 2017). Quality is usually assessed using measures of clinical processes 
judged to represent best practice (e.g. medication reviews) or using outcomes (e.g. risk-
adjusted readmission rates). The intention is that improvements against these quality metrics 
will ultimately translate into improved health. The programmes are heterogeneous across 
countries and evidence regarding their effectiveness remains ambiguous, with a subset of 
schemes showing moderately positive effects (Milstein and Schreyoegg, 2016; Ogundeji et al., 
2016; Busse, 2016; Mendelson et al., 2017; Cattel et al., 2018; Scott et al., 2018; Vlaanderen 
et al., 2019).  
P4P has been widely used by the English National Health Service (NHS) for over a decade. The 
NHS introduced the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) within primary care in 2004 
(Roland, 2004), followed by Advancing Quality within secondary care in 2008 (Sutton et al., 
2012) and Best Practice Tariffs in 2010 (Allen et al., 2016). The Advancing Quality scheme was 
introduced in one region for patients with five conditions, and subsequently integrated into 
a national scheme known as the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) 
framework in 2009/10 (Meacock et al., 2014).  
CQUIN covers NHS providers of acute, community, mental health and ambulance services. A 
proportion of provider income depends on performance on a set of indicators that are 
intended to stimulate quality and innovation. Unlike previous P4P schemes in England where 
bonus payments were made for meeting targets, a proportion of contract payment is 
withheld under CQUIN schemes unless quality indicators are met. CQUIN therefore does not 
involve additional funding. If quality targets are not achieved, a provider ?s budget is reduced. 
An initial feature of the scheme was that indicators and targets were locally agreed between 
commissioners and providers, rather than set nationally (Department of Health, 2008) 
although since 2010/11 a mandatory national element was introduced. The local design 
feature has disappeared over time partly in response to an earlier evaluation (McDonald et 
al., 2013).  
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In 2012 England introduced the Health and Social Care Act (Timmins, 2012; Turner and Powell, 
2016) and responsibility for commissioning healthcare was transferred to newly formed 
bodies. Commissioning responsibility for emergency, elective, and community care was 
transferred to local Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). Responsibility for commissioning 
143 so-called  ‘specialised services ? was placed with the national body, NHS England (Powell, 
2016). Since then, the national CQUIN framework includes two schemes: CCG-CQUIN schemes 
which cover care commissioned by local CCG purchasers; and Prescribed Specialised Services 
(PSS) CQUIN schemes which cover specialised services commissioned nationally by NHS 
England but managed locally by commissioning teams (hubs). The CCG-CQUIN has been 
reviewed elsewhere (Kristensen et al., 2013; McDonald et al., 2013). Here we focus on the 
newer PSS-CQUIN schemes for specialised services, launched in 2013 with the aim of 
improving the quality of specialised care and achieving value for money. 
 
The CQUIN programme for Prescribed Specialised Services 
What are specialised services? 
Specialised services are provided by relatively few hospitals to support people with rare and 
complex conditions, including rare cancers and genetic disorders. They include a wide range 
of treatments from chemotherapy and kidney dialysis to inpatient mental health care and 
surgical procedures like stem cell transplants (NHS England, 2017a). 
Specialised services are delivered by qualified teams working predominantly in teaching 
hospitals, large and specialist providers (National Audit Office, 2016). The budget for 
specialised services in England was £14.6 billion or 14.4% of NHS England budget in 2015/16 
(National Audit Office, 2016) and increased to £16.6 billion in 2017/18 (Department of Health, 
2018; NHS England, 2018).  
Commissioning responsibility for specialised services is separate because of technological 
knowledge required and the financial risk. There are four factors that determine whether NHS 
England commissions services as specialised (Health and Social Care Act, 2012; NHS England, 
2017b): the individuals who require the service; its cost; workers ability to provide the service; 
and financial implications for local purchasers.  
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Contractual arrangements 
The PSS-CQUIN for specialised services links a proportion of provider income to the 
achievement of quality improvement and innovation goals.  A key feature of the PSS-CQUIN 
is that whilst incentive schemes and indicators are centrally developed by NHS England, 
performance targets are locally agreed between each provider and regional NHS England 
commissioning hubs. This differs from the original design of CCG-CQUIN for non-specialised 
services where schemes and targets were locally agreed (Kristensen et al., 2013).  
In its central development, NHS England draws up a national menu of PSS-CQUIN schemes to 
be selected from. There are multiple incentive schemes for each clinical area (known as a 
Programme of Care), defined by the improvement they aim to achieve. For example, within 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵĞĚŝĐŝŶĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ “ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐĐĂƌĚŝĂĐƐƵƌŐĞƌǇŶŽŶ-elective inpatient waiting ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞ 
(IM1 in 2016/17), and  “CABG within seven days of an angiogram or within seven days of 
transfer to a non-elective pathway ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞmeasure employed (NHS England, 2016). NHS 
England commissioners then negotiates annual contracts with each provider, and propose a 
selected package of schemes from this national menu to form part of this contract.  
When selecting a PSS-CQUIN package, there are three elements which can differ across 
providers: a) the schemes selected from the national menu, b) the target achievement 
required to earn the payment, and c) the proportion of overall PSS-CQUIN payment attached 
to each scheme.  
NHS England commissioners select schemes from the national menu that are applicable to a 
provider where there is significant opportunity for improvement, prioritising schemes judged 
to represent best value. The target is set based upon providers ? current performance to 
represent attainable targets. The proportion of total payment for each scheme is calculated 
using an algorithm based on costs and value in addition to the service size and overall 
specialised service contract size. In total, 2.5% of the contract value for specialised services 
for each provider is linked to these PSS-CQUIN incentive metrics.  
A provider is then free to accept or reject the PSS-CQUIN offered by the commissioner, 
forfeiting the 2.5% contract value for specialised care if they fail to accept it (i.e. funds are 
withheld and provideƌ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚŝƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ). At first, payments were agreed on each year, but 
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since April 2017 contracts run for two years. Schemes can be rolled forward for another 
contracting round, but incentives are intended to be short-term interventions. Metrics are 
incentivised in the short-term to encourage activity to become embedded in practice, at 
which point the financial incentives is removed.  
The list of schemes included in the PSS-CQUIN has changed over time. At its launch in 
2013/14, 27 incentive schemes were included. This increased to 61 in 2014/15 to widen the 
range of clinical areas. In 2015/16 43 PSS-CQUIN schemes were available, reduced to 26 
schemes in 2016/17. They were further revised in 2017/18, including retirement of 10, 
introduction of 9, expansion and merger of four schemes. Table 1 summarises the schemes 
in 2016/17 and the two-year period 2017/19, and describes main outcomes and payment.  
[Table 1 here] 
A provider receives payment when they achieve a target, referred to as  “trigger ?, often 
assessed quarterly. Triggers are typically incremental or tiered, e.g. (1) establish a working 
group, (2) team building and training, (3) using the survey instrument to establish a baseline, 
and (4) activating a response (GE2).  Partial payments for proportionally achieving triggers are 
possible.  Most triggers are assessed on an absolute basis (i.e. hospital meets the target) 
rather than a relative basis (i.e. hospital is amongst top X performers). 
In 2016/17 total payments to providers for PSS-CQUIN schemes was £137.84m (less than 
target contract value due to non-achievement by some Trusts). Blood and Infection schemes 
made up the largest payment (£62.58m), followed by Mental Health schemes (£21.36m), and 
General schemes (£21.29m). Women and Children schemes had the smallest payment 
(£1.63m). When examining individual schemes, development of Operational Delivery 
Networks (ODN) to improve hepatitis-C-virus (HCV) treatment pathways had greatest value 
with £59m between 23 providers.  
 
What is incentivised and how? 
We analysed the content of 26 PSS schemes ŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƵƐŝŶŐŽŶĂďĞĚŝĂŶ ?ƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
structure, process and outcome (Donabedian, 2005). Structure refers to the setting in which 
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healthcare is delivered, such as the adequacy of facilities or qualifications of medical staff. 
Process focuses on what and how healthcare is delivered. Outcome relates to health 
outcomes or other policy objectives (such as efficiency). This categorisation is informed by 
earlier work (Campbell et al., 2000) who reviewed the NHS National Performance Framework.  
[Table 2 here] 
As shown in Table 2 two schemes incentivise structure and three incentivise structure and 
process. The TR3 scheme is an example of incentivising structure.  It seeks to establish regional 
spinal surgery networks, data flows and multi-disciplinary teams (MDT) for surgery patients, 
effectively changing the setting in which health care is delivered.  The evidence to support 
this scheme came from a spinal network pilot site (although no citation was provided), and 
the scheme documentation refers to significant savings of £140m across England for minimal 
costs of an MDT, citing a cancer MDT costing £110 per patient.  
 
GE1 incentivises structure and process. This scheme focuses on Clinical Utilisation Review 
(CUR) which promotes the introduction of a clinical decision-support software to identify 
suitable care according to clinical need. Implementation of CUR can improve efficiency 
reducing unnecessary length of stays, hospital admissions, bed-days, avoidable discharge 
delays, unexplained clinical variation and can improve outcomes through ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
and satisfaction (Lewis and Edwards, 2015). The scheme documentation refers to 
retrospective CUR audits suggesting improvements are possible and international evidence 
on benefits of CUR software (though no citations are provided). The scheme incentivises 
structure and process, with initial payments related to installation and implementation of 
CUR and further payments related to reductions in bed-days and emergency admissions, and 
a final payment for reporting to commissioners and stakeholders.  
 
Table 2 suggests that the majority of the schemes incentivised process. For example, the 
Nationally Standardised Dose Banding Adult Intravenous Systemic Anticancer Therapy (SACT) 
scheme (CA2) incentivises processes to standardise doses of SACT. Initial payments are made 
for collection of baseline data and having a Drugs and Therapeutics committee agree and 
approve principles of dose banding. Subsequent payments are made if dose banding targets, 
agreed locally, are met. Intended behavioural effects are to improve patient safety and to 
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increase efficiency through reduction in drugs costs and waste.  The document for CA2 refers 
to the use of dose banding in Scotland, and previous attempts in England where savings of 
£1m were achieved.  As with other schemes no citations are provided to evidence the effect. 
 
Only two PSS-CQUIN schemes in 2016/17 explicitly incentivise outcomes, which are for mental 
health. One of these (MH4) incentivises good practice with respect to involving families and 
carers of children and adolescents using mental health services. In addition to incentivising 
some initial process measures of care, the final payment trigger is based on the proportion of 
ĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƵƉŽŶĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐŚĂƌŐĞ.  
Summary information on the incentivised measures is available in the public domain in 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶŶƵĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĚĞƚĂŝůǀĂƌŝĞƐ. 
 
Discussion: strengths and weaknesses of PSS CQUIN 
We critically assess the PSS-CQUIN scheme, and discuss strengths and weaknesses of the 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƐĚĞƐŝŐŶĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? 
Centralised versus decentralised decision making. A key feature of PSS-CQUIN is the mix of 
centralised and local decision making. Whilst the list of schemes on offer is centrally designed 
at the national level, the selection of schemes from this menu is negotiated locally, along with 
performance targets required to earn payment. This approach was taken because local 
negotiation in the original CQUIN had inhibited effectiveness due to lack of ability to 
benchmark across providers (McDonald et al., 2013).  
The mixed approach has the potential to exploit synergies or scale economies in the 
development of technical schemes at the central level (therefore saving resources to local 
commissioners), while accommodating needs and preferences at the local level.  Whilst this 
mixed approach builds on evidence from a previous programme, the nature of specialised 
services makes these schemes more technical and complex. In turn the greater complexity 
can weaken behavioural responses if it becomes more difficult for providers to estimate the 
relationship between effort and reward (Mehrotra et al., 2010). One risk from the local nature 
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of negotiations arises if providers have more bargaining power than others generating 
inequitable targets across providers (Fichera et al., 2016).  
Even if the list of schemes is centrally designed, contract negotiations can be resource 
intensive for both national commissioners and local providers, meaning that the cost of the 
scheme is larger than the incentive payments and these additional resources need to be 
included in cost-effectiveness estimates (NHS England, 2017c, page 8; Meacock et al., 2013).  
Performance measures. Most of incentivised indicators are process measures. This is in line 
with the literature on P4P, which suggests that linking incentives to process measures is more 
effective at inducing effort than linking incentives directly to outcomes (Ogundeji et al., 2016; 
Conrad and Perry, 2009; Mendelson et al., 2017). Providers have more direct control of 
process, while health outcomes may reflect external factors. Appropriate risk-adjustment 
may be more difficult to develop in the context of specialised care.  
Efforts to document that the incentivised process measures are evidence-based represents 
an improvement on the original CQUIN scheme. However, while PSS-CQUIN schemes 
documentation have  “^ƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ'ƵŝĚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚZĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? it is difficult to judge the quality 
of the evidence because citations are often missing. Without sources it is not always clear 
why specific quality indicators were chosen, and if there is evidence linking intermediary 
processes with health improvements.  
Several indicators are structure measures rewarding providers for investing in specific areas. 
A weakness is that there may be even less evidence to document how structure translates 
into better processes and outcomes. Nevertheless, for specialised care there may be a 
rationale for paying for structure if there are large fixed costs that are required for innovation, 
or if it is difficult to identify optimal processes (due to lack of evidence) or reliable process 
measures (Birkmeyer et al., 2004). 
Payment structure. A tiered payment structure with payments linked to different triggers 
(thresholds) reduces the financial risk to providers compared to an all-or-nothing target. 
Additional, more refined triggers are likely to be even more effective at inducing continuous 
effort improvement (Mehrotra et al., 2010) but at the cost of additional complexity.  
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Rachet effects. Another feature of PSS-CQUIN is its dynamic nature, with the number and type 
of schemes evolving over time. The advantage is that the scheme is flexible and can divert 
funds to new areas with potential to improve quality and efficiency. When providers improve 
performance in line with the incentive design, the scheme can be withdrawn and contracted 
as  “standard ? without incentive payment. However, this introduces what is known as the 
 “ƌĂĐŚĞƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ? ^ŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ĐĂŶ ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ƚŚĂt the scheme will be withdrawn, the 
incentive to improve is weakened. Empirical evidence on incentive withdrawal is mixed. 
Recent evidence from a long-running primary care pay-for-performance scheme in England 
found that performance on previously-incentivised quality measures declined immediately 
once the financial incentives are removed (Minchin et al., 2018). An earlier study had found 
that performance remained stable after withdrawal, although in that instance clinically-linked 
incentives remained active (Kontopantelis et al. 2014). Short-term incentives provided by PSS-
CQUIN may fail to induce long-term improvements. To mitigate this, PSS-CQUIN schemes 
have an  ‘Exit Plan ?, which acknowledges how the change and performance requirements can 
be sustained once an indicator is retired. These include reworking tariff payments, developing 
appropriate tariff codes or an explicit recognition that a scheme is self-sustaining if it provides 
cost-savings. 
Amount paid. The size of PSS-CQUIN incentive payments are set to reflect typical provider 
costs with an additional incentive payment of 25% increasing to 50% in 2017/19. Still, this 
payment could be below the optimal price, which has been shown to depend on the marginal 
benefit of health gains, provider motivation and opportunity costs of public funds (Kristensen 
et al., 2016). The effect of incentive size on positive outcomes remains uncertain, with two 
systematic reviews providing conflicting conclusions (Ogundeji et al., 2016; Scott et al., 2018).  
Penalties vs. bonuses. A defining feature of the scheme is that it relies on withholding funds 
rather than bonus payments. This implies that if a provider does not achieve its targets it will 
not receive the full expected budget, and may be unable to cover costs. The scheme thus 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂ “ŶŽŶ-ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŚĞŵĞand can be viewed as a penalty when the 
initial payment scheme is the reference point (Kristensen, 2017; Rosenthal, 2007). Penalty 
schemes have been highlighted as potentially cost-effective (Maynard, 2012). Although 
behavioural economics suggests that penalties are perceived as higher-powered relative to 
bonus schemes, this hypothesis is derived from loss-aversion theory and only supported by 
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evidence at an individual level. Little is known about how penalties affect large organisations, 
which are arguably less risk averse (Kristensen, 2017).  
Like other P4P schemes, PSS-CQUIN schemes could be subject to other potential unintended 
consequences, such as gaming and effort diversion to unincentivised care.   
 
Conclusion 
Substantial work has been undertaken to design PSS-CQUIN schemes and metrics for 
specialised care. Whilst this scheme could be transferred to other countries, potential 
implementers need to be aware of the following issues.  
Although uncertainties about the scheme reflect uncertainties on the effectiveness of P4P 
more broadly, the complexity of specialised care requires significant specific investments 
including linking the performance measures to evidence base, and not every country may be 
able/willing to afford such investments. Such investments may justify a centralised approach 
to develop performance measures that exploit synergies and scale economies.  
The complexity of specialised care also makes the development of health outcome measures 
more difficult, justifying a focus on process measures, and rewarding providers for 
improvement over time rather than across providers though this approach is vulnerable to 
rachet effects.   
P4P for specialised care remains rare and future evaluation of PSS-CQUIN will contribute to 
the evidence base.   
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Table 1: PSS-CQUIN schemes in 2016/17 and 2017/19  
 
Programme of care  Scheme    16/17  17/19 Brief description of the expected outcomes  General scheme payment  
General Schemes GE1 x x Implement CUR for reduction in inappropriate hospital utilisation Per provider + per activity  
GE2 x x Use of the PAM survey to improve outcomes   £50,000/provider (>=500 patients)  
GE3 x  Monitor hand hygiene to reduce healthcare acquired infections  £2,000/bed 
GE3  x Optimise hospital use of high cost drugs 1% tariff-excluded high cost drugs   
GE4 x  Incentivise appropriate use of cardiac devices to address patients need 1% device expenditure  
GE4  x Redesign service to adopt most efficient provider service models Programme costs plus 50%  
GE5  x Ensure all relevant treatment options are discussed with patients £60,000/250 patients±£60/patient 
Blood and Infection  BI1 x x Improve HCV ODNs £100,000/net+1.6% overall CQUIN  
BI2 x x Improve use of Haemtrack patient reporting system at home (£12,000 + £800 + £6,000)/patient 
BI3 x x Incentivise automated exchange transfusions for sickle cell disease £350/automated transfusion 
BI4 x x Improve Haemoglobinopathy ODNs £50,000/provider 
Cancer CA1 x  Improve access for patients with incurable cancer to ESC £500/patient (<800 patients) 
CA1/IM1  x Improve access for patients with incurable cancer/HPB to ESC £600/patient 
CA2 x  Standardise the doses of SACT (19 agents)  0.5% annual chemotherapy spend 
CA2  x Standardise the doses of SACT (31 agents) 1% annual chemotherapy spend 
CA3  x Optimise decision making for patients with palliative treatment   £35,000 + £40/patient  
Internal Medicine IM1 x  Reduce waiting times for patients referred for CABG £10,000+ £150/reduced wait day  
IM2 x x Provide direct feedback on compliance with treatment regime  £65,000/site + addition to Sheffield  
IM3 x x Review cases by MDTs for policy compliance with data flow to registries £150/patient 
IM4  x Optimise use of complex Cardiac Implantable Electronic Devices   £100,000+2% device expenditure 
Trauma TR1 x  Reduce delayed discharges from adult critical care Per provider or per baseline patient  
TR2 x  Improve timely access to specialist and pre-empt costly complications £1,000/patients expected 
TR3 x x Establish MDTs to sanction referrals for surgery, with data entering  £50,000/network + £150/patient 
Women and 
Children 
WC1 x  Improve asthma control in children within twelve weeks of referral £31,250/provider 
WC2 x  Implement home monitor to pre-empt costly problems  £2,000/infant 
WC3 x  Apply MH screening for paediatric in-patients with chronic condition £25/patient for SDQ screening 
WC3 
 x Apply MH screening for paediatric in-patients with chronic condition (expanded 
to include possible CAMHS liaison and questionnaire) 
£30/patient for SDQ screening 
WC4  x Improve utilisation of efficiency of paediatric intensive care beds  £210,000/PICU  
WC5  x Optimise the use of neonatal care through improve community support £200,000/Outreach Team 
Mental Health  MH1 x  Implement "Sense of Community" in High Secure Wards £250,000+£2,500xB+£7,500xC * 
15 
 
MH1  x Implement "Sense of Community" in High Secure Wards £300,000+£3,500xB+£9,000XC * 
MH2 x x Deliver education and training courses to complement treatment  £10,000/provider+£2,000/patient 
MH3 x x Develop/implement/evaluate a framework on reduction of restrictive practices £20,000/provider+£1,200/patient 
MH4 x  Involve family and carers through a CAMHS journey £25,000/provider+£1,000/bed 
MH4  x Remove hold-ups in discharge  £210,000/PICU  
MH5 x  Develop benchmark processes, performance planning, standard setting £40,000/provider 
MH5  x Improve transition/discharge young people reaching adulthood  0.5% of expenditure on CAMHS 
MH6 x  Adhere to standards for Gender Identity Clinics £40,000/provider 
MH7 x  Support woman rapid recovery through involvement of partners £40,000/provider 
Note: CABG: Coronary Artery Bypass Graft; CF: Cystic Fibrosis; CAMHS:  Children and Adolescent Mental Health Services CUR: Clinical Utilisation Review; ESC: Enhanced 
Supportive Care; HCV:  Hepatitis C Virus; HPB: Hepato-Pancreato-Biliary; MDT: Multidisciplinary team; ODN: Operational Delivery Networks; PAM: Patient Activation 
Measurement; SACT: Systemic Anti-Cancer Therapy; SCIC: Spinal Cord Injury Centre;  
* B = The number of patients in wards included in the in the partial intervention arms of the trial. C = The number of patients in wards included in the in the full intervention 
arm of the trial, see MH1 scheme for details.
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Table 2: What is incentivised in the 2016/17 CQUIN schemes 
* see Table 1 for details of the schemes. 
Programme of care  Scheme *   Structure Process Outcome 
General Schemes GE1 X X  
GE2  X  
GE3  X  
GE4  X  
Blood and Infection  BI1 X X  
BI2  X  
BI3  X  
BI4 X   
Cancer CA1  X  
CA2  X  
Internal Medicine IM1  X  
IM2  X  
IM3 X X  
Trauma TR1  X  
TR2  X  
TR3 X   
Women and Children WC1  X  
WC2  X  
WC3  X  
Mental Health  MH1  X  
MH2  X  
MH3  X  
MH4  X X 
MH5  X  
MH6  X X 
MH7  X  
